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I study the business cycle implications of job destruction in
a job search model in which each firm employs many
heterogenous workers and faces decreasing marginal return
technology in the case of monopolistic competition. Because
marginal revenue is not linear and workers are heterogenous
within a firm, I employ the model of Nosaka (2008), which
extends the models of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and Smith
(1999) to circumstances that include heterogenous workers.
I calibrate the model using US data in line with den Haan et
al. (2000) and present the calibrated results.
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1  introduction
There is extensive literature on the manner in which the imperfec
tion of the markets influences the dynamics of business cycles.
Recently, some of these works have paid considerable attention to
the imperfection in the labor markets in the study of unemployment
fluctuation. In order to incorporate the friction in the labor market, it
is especially common to employ the job search model by Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), because this model is tractable and theoreti
cally consistent. In their model, each firm has one job and posts a
vacancy to fill the position. Unemployed workers searching for jobs
take time to find this vacancy: in this process of job search lies the
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source of unemployment.
The incorporation of job search environments leads to persistent
unemployment and employment in business cycle models. The busi
ness cycle implications of Job search models were studied by Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996), and were further extended in various
ways to overcome the unsatisfactory aspects of the model's predic
tion.^ First, endogenous Job separation is introduced in real business
cycle models (den Haan et al. 2000; Michelacci and Lopez-Salido
2007). Second, the monetary aspects and stickiness of nominal
prices are introduced in New Keynesian models. Job separation is
exogenous in some models (Trigari 2003, 2006; Christoffel and
Linzert 2005; Hashimzade and Ortigueira 2005; Gertler and Trigari
2006; Rotemberg 2006; Blanchard and Gali 2008; Faia 2008), and
endogenous in others (Cooley and Quadrini 1999; Walsh 2003; Trigari
2004; Walsh 2005; Andres et al. 2006; Krause and Lubik 2007b).
Although the employment levels within a firm are irrelevant in most
of the above models,^ recent studies further investigate the case in
which the employment size matters in creating Job openings. This
extension is particularly important in the models of monopolistic
competition in many business cycle models, because the employment
level is influenced by the level of demand. In dealing with this exten
sion, several works employ a simple wage bargaining solution that is
developed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b), Smith (1999), Cahuc
and Wasmer (2001), and Cahuc et al. (2008). The quantitative impli
cations of models are then investigated regarding the real economies
(Cheron and Langot 2004; Ebell and Haefke 2006; Rotemberg 2006;
Yashiv 2006; Krause and Lubik 2007a), while the monetary implica
tions of the models are studied by the recent works (Moyen and
Sahuc 2005; Delacroix 2006; Krause et al. 2007).
In those models, however, it is hard to obtain a simple bargaining
solution when there exists heterogeneity of workers within a firm.^
This creates a serious problem in business cycle models, because
^  For the problems regarding the job search models and possible solutions, refer to Shimer (2005) and Hall
(2005).
2  For the generality of the standard approach, refer to Pissarides (2000), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001),
Marimon and Zilibotti (2000), Acemoglu (2001), Trigari (2004), and Walsh (2003, 2005).
^  Cahuc et al. (2008) provide an extension of the bargaining solution of Stole and Zwiebel that includes
heterogenous workers, but Job separation is exogenous within each category of workers.
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recent work reveals that the dynamics of job separation plays an
important role in accounting for the trends in business cycles (Yashiv
2006; Mortensen and Nagypal 2007), and the heterogeneity of
workers is critical in obtaining endogenous Job separation. Given this
problem, I examine the business cycle implications of Nosaka (2008),
whose bargaining solution is an extension of that of Stole and
Zwiebel's to include heterogenous workers. Owing to differences in
productivity among workers within a firm. Job separation endogenously
occurs.
I study the business cycle implications of a model in which there
are monopolistically competitive firms, and employ the model of den
Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) (hereafter, DRW) as a benchmark.
DRW study a Job search model with endogenous Job separation
where firms are perfectly competitive. They show that the interactions
of capital adjustment costs and the labor market produce significant
and persistent effects on output. Since my model includes perfect
competition as a special case, it is possible to compare my calibrated
results with the results of DRW. Although the models are different, the
implications of my model under perfect competition are in line with
those of DRW. In particular, the lead and lag patterns of Job creation
and Job destruction rates are similar. Thus, when studying business
cycle implications, the assumption of large firms preserves most of
the properties of the standard Job search models when firms are
perfectly competitive.
In the case of monopolistic competition, I consider the effects of
changing the markup rates. When the markup rate increases, output
and labor demand decrease as a result of an increased monopoly
power in the steady state. This weak labor demand reduces the tight
ness of the labor market, which in turn increases the duration of
unemployment. Moreover, firms can easily find unemployed workers
and, consequently. Job destruction becomes sensitive to technology
shocks. These two effects generate a greater persistence of tech
nology shock on employment when the markup rate is high. This
result differs from that of Hornstein (1993) without Job search frictions,
in which increased markup rates reduce the employment fluctuation
relative to output fluctuation in response to the technology shock. The
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obtained property is clearly common in the models that include search
frictions and monopolistically competitive firms, such as those in
Trigari (2004), Rotemberg (2006), and Andres etal. (2006). Rotemberg
(2006) in particular studies the effect of variations in market power in
the job search model, and, therefore, the result of the current study
is closely related to them.
There is related literature that deals with the effects of job destruc
tion in business cycle models in which one firm employs many
workers under the decreasing marginal return technology. First,
Bertola and Caballero (1994), Bertola and Garibaldi (2001), and
Koeniger and Prat (2007) construct models of heterogenous firms but
homogenous workers within each firm. In contrast to their study, the
present paper studies the models of homogenous firms but heterog
enous workers within each firm.
Second, the present model is related to the job search models that
include endogenous job separation and bargaining under decreasing
marginal return technology (Helpman et al. 2008; Krause and Lubik
2007a; Krause et. al. 2007). Helpman et al. (2008) study a model of
heterogenous workers within a firm using the bargaining solution of
Stole and Zwiebel under the decreasing marginal return technology.
In their model, however, the abilities of workers are unknown to the
firms and job separation decisions are made through some specific
screening technology. This stands in contrast with the present model
where workers of low ability are fired at no cost. Moreover, they focus
on steady states. Instead of resorting to the exogenous screening
technology, my model examines a consistent bargaining solution to
justify endogenous job separation.
Krause and Lubik (2007a) and Krause et al. (2007) independently
study the business cycle implications of large firms in which marginal
revenue is decreasing."* Krause and Lubik (2007a) show that the
introduction of the interactions within each firm plays a minor role in
calibration when job destruction is exogenous. This is consistent with
the results of the present model. Krause et al. (2007) deliver the cali
brated results in the case of the New Keynesian model in which job
Krause and Lubik (2007b) study a large firm but they assume that employment and wage are determined
independently. Consequently, employment and wage interactions are absent in the bargaining process in
their model.
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destruction is endogenous. However, the mechanism that produces
job separation is different in their model because workers are essen
tially homogenous and separated unless the firms pay the costs. This
separation mechanism is clearly different from the present model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the basic model. Section 3 provides the calibrated results, and Section
4 concludes the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
I  follow Nosaka (2008) regarding the basic setup and notations
and extend it to the case of monopolistic competition that includes
household sectors, aggregate technology shocks, and capital goods.
It is a discrete time model with search friction in the labor market.
There are two goods: final goods and intermediate goods. First, the
firms in the final-goods sector are competitive and use the continuum
of intermediate goods as inputs for production. The output of the final-
goods firm is denoted by y. Second, there exists a continuum of
monopolistically competitive firms that produce intermediate goods,
each of which is indexed by y on the unit interval [0, 1]. Each firm
produces one type of intermediate goods and its production level is
called y/. The firms in the intermediate-goods sector employ capital
and labor as inputs - these input levels are denoted by kj and %,
respectively. Although capital is available with one period of delay,
there exists search frictions in the labor market and the firm needs to
post Job vacancies of Vj to employ workers. We provide the details of
the labor market in the next subsection.
2.2 Labor market
Owing to search frictions in the labor market, unemployed workers
indexed by i seek Jobs, and vacant firms post Job vacancies in order
to employ workers. Suppose that is the measure of the total vacan
cies posted in the labor market and is the measure of unemployed
workers. Since the continuum of intermediate-goods firms post Job
vacancies Vj, the level of Job vacancies follows the feasibility condi
tion.
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= f Vjdj. (1)
J 0
The measure of the matched workers is denoted by H u^),
and the ratio of to u'^ yields what is known as the tightness of the
labor market, i.e., 6 = v^/u'^. Random matching implies that the prob
abilities of finding partners for an unemployed worker and a firm are
= 0(1,0-1) e = q(d)e and =
0(1,0-1) = q($)^ respectively (I assume that O is homogenous of
degree one).
2.3 Firms
The production function of competitive firms in the final-goods
sector has the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) property.
rl . 0--1 s _2_
where a > 1. By normalizing the price of the final goods to one, the
profit maximization conditions of the final-goods industry yield the
factor demand function for the intermediate goods of j as follows:
Vj = ypj"- (2)
Each intermediate good, j, is produced by a monopolistically
competitive firm j, who faces the demand function of (2). Production
requires labor and capital. Although capital is purchased with one
period of delay, there is friction in hiring workers. I first present an
environment of labor input, and then consider the production structure
that includes capital input.
With regard to the labor input, firms create job vacancies to employ
workers. The law of motion in employment is expressed in the
following manner:
hj < rij, n'j = q{6)vj + (1 - 5w)nj. (3)
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In the above expression, du, is the exogenous job separation rate.
Moreover, % and % are the measures of employed workers before
and after endogenous Job separation, respectively. Finally, x' denote
the variable of x in the next period.
With respect to the capital input, we assume that the firm j is able
to alter the capital level of k'j in the next period by investing ij, such
that they follow the standard law of motion for capital:
k'j = ij + (1 - S)kj,
where <3 is the depreciation rate of capital.
Following Nosaka (2008), the production function is the sum of two
parts: the homogenous part of production (y,) and the heterogenous
productivity of workers (»;,). The homogenous part is a function of
labor input (%) and capital input (k,), as well as the level of tech
nology (a).
yj = kj{ahjy (4)
where the log of a follows the AR(1) process.
Ina'= (1 — p") Inao + p"lna-I- (5)
In the above expression, ao is the scale parameter of the production
function and is an i.i.d. process, which follows the normal distribu
tion N(0,al). The heterogenous productivity of worker i is denoted by
rji, drawn independently from the distribution of Gfjj). In equilibrium,
firm j fires any worker whose productivity is below the critical value
of which leads to the next relation:
= G{rij)nj, (6)
where Gfrj) = 1 — Gfrf). Consequently, the output of heterogenous
parts is
J^r]dG{ri)POO J-q.
Hj r]dG{ri) = hj ^—^nj^iVj)-
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Finally, the sum of the homogenous and heterogenous parts produces
the output of Pjyj+n,^Vl)
When contingent claims for possible events are available, the
discount rate of firms is the price of the contingent claim, which is
denoted by x'. Given this discount factor, the firm's profit maximization
condition leads to the value of the firm Jiuj, kj, a):
J{nj,kj,a) = max pjy^+ hj^ri ) - w{nj,kj,a,ri )-ij - cvj + Ea'\aJ{n'pkpa')x',
s.t. n'j = q{d)vj + (1 - Sw)nj, hj = G{ii.)nj, (7)
fij < Uj,
k'j = ij + {l-5)kj, (8)
where c is the cost of opening the job vacancy, and w(nj, kj, a,rij) is
the total wage payment.
Finally, the demand and production function leads to a formula for
the revenue, given below as
PjVj = = y^ (g)
wherea„ = (1 - a) (a - l)/a and a.k =a(CT - l)/a.
2.4 Wage determination
As revealed by the revenue function in the last subsection, the
marginal revenue is decreasing in the labor input; therefore, the stan
dard Nash bargaining cannot be employed in this case. Instead, when
the marginal return is decreasing and there is heterogeneity among
workers within a firm, we use the bargaining solution of Nosaka
(2008), which is an extension of that of Stole and Zwiebel.® Applying
the formula and imposing the symmetry, {y, = y), we have
®  Here, note that the heterogenous part of productivity, {ni^ (^)), is produced in terms of the normalized final
goods, the price of which is one. For simplicity, the price of investment goods is also taken as one.
® Refer to (17) in Nosaka (2008). Note that in the present paper a is replaced with an.
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w'(hi,ki.a.n) = 1 _ ^ gf' + (1 - ■»)(t + + »),
= r^^^^ + (i-«(' + =A»)+*^' <10)1 - (1 - an)(t> rij '\ 1-4) j
With this bargained outcome, the total payment of wage, w, is calcu
lated as follows:
w{nj, kj, a, -q.) = w''{nj,kj,a, 0)nj +
2.5 Optimal policies of the firms
The firms make the optimal decisions regarding job creation (vj)
and Job destruction (% and 2/) •
The first-order conditions provide the next two conditions/
c = (1 - 4.)q(9)Ex' /"(V - 2') dG(t)'), (11)
+  + (12)
VI-<^(1-Q:„)n q{e)
In addition, we need the first-order condition for capital (refer to the
Appendix).
l = Ex'( ''"Z"" / + !-<)■ (13)
VI -0(1 -an) fc' )
2.6 Households and equilibrium
Finally, I consider the households. Although the workers are
affected by idiosyncratic shocks, they can insure against such shocks
due to the existence of contingent claims. I assume the following
identical utility across households:
-j-OO ^1-C 1
(14)
t=0
^  Refer to (18) and (19) in Nosaka (2008).
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The optimal solution of the representative households produces the
pricing rule for the contingent claims and the resource constraints as
below:
Ct = yt + ht^{rQ-it-cvt + h{l-nt). (16)
Then, the symmetric equilibrium is given by the sequence (kt, Ut, nt,
Vt, yu dt, Ct, it, that satisfies the three optimal conditions of (11),
(12), and (13) with the feasibility conditions of (4), (7), (8), (15), (16),
and Q ■=■ v/ iX - n)-
3 Calibration
Following Cooley and Quadrini (1999), Walsh (2003), and Trigari
(2004), I calibrate the model with endogenous job separation by
linearizing the models. I use the following form of the matching func
tion:
q{e) =
The heterogenous productivity of workers, rj, is generated as
follows:
T] = X — d,
where the log oix follows a normal distribution of Ar(/^^, and d is
a constant number. Although the heterogenous productivity arises as
the output in equilibrium, I prefer to disregard this contribution when
this part is aggregated over the entire economy in the steady state,
because this normalization facilitates the comparison with other stan
dard models without heterogenous workers. Since the aggregate
output of the heterogenous part is represented as W (v) n, I choose d
to satisfy VF(^)« = 0 in the steady state.
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In the present model, data on the gross value of job destruction
and Job creation is not available if each firm is taken as a unit of
activity in the survey data. Hence, in order to observe the gross
numbers, I assume that every firm owns a number of establishments,
each of which employs one worker. Under this assumption, the gross
numbers of Job creation and destruction are observable if the survey
is conducted on an establishment basis.
In order to evaluate the gross numbers, it is also important to
consider whether establishments destroy Jobs and hire new workers
within one period. I follow the assumption of DRW that only the estab
lishments that lose workers for exogenous reasons post Job openings.
Some of them fill vacancies within a period; this is not included in the
Job creation and destruction data. Accordingly, the observed creation
rate and destruction rate are
ere = and
des = -—n + —liOjSwn respectively.
Note that Job creation and Job destruction are smaller by q(d)du,n.
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1. The basic
parameters such as 13, d, and pa are standard in the real busi
ness cycle literature.® I assume that a is 0.5, which is larger than the
value given in the literature. This is because the income share of
capital is much smaller than the elasticity of the capital in the produc
tion function (a) under the bargaining solution in the present model,
and a large value of a is necessary to provide a reasonable income
share of capital.
I  follow Table 1 of DRW in the choice of the parameters in the
labor market P/, 6, du,, G(V), a,,, c, and b). Further, the param
eters of the matching function (go and qi) are chosen to produce the
same elasticity of the matching function with respect to 0, as in DRW
at the steady state value of tightness.® For the parameters of the
® We assume the log linear utility function by imposing that C = 1 •
® This is because the matching function in DRW is different from that in the present model.
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Table 1 Parameters for Calibration
Basic parameters
0.99 discount rate
d 0.025 depreciation rate
<p 0.5 bargaining power
1 log utility
0.007 s.e. of technology shock
P" 0.95 technology shock
a 0.50 production function
Labor market parameters
c 0.203 vacancy cost
b 2.22 unemployed benefit
pw 0.45 prob. finding job
P' 0.71 prob. filling a vacancy
e 0.6338 tightness
du> 0.068 exogenous separation rate
G(ri) 0.032 endogenous sep. rate
0.3591 matching function
% 0.598 matching function
P.C. M.C.
1.21 1.20 mean of ln(?7)
0.10 0.10 s.e. of ln(77)
d 3.36 3.36 normalization
n -0.60 -0.60 critical productivity
o oo 6 substitution
0.38 0.49 technology
distribution of the heterogenous part of productivity (rj), ii is chosen
to be consistent with the job creation condition of (11) and the endog
enous Job separation rate of 0.032 in DRW at the steady state. Given
this level of the endogenous Job separation rate, d and are set to
satisfy W(2) = 0 as mentioned above. The technology parameter of
ao is determined by the rest of the parameter restrictions. For the
parameter of o that determines the markup rates, I use a = <» in the
case of perfect competition, and I choose various levels of a in the
case of monopolistic competition.
The results of the second moments are summarized in Table 2 in
the perfect competition case, where P.C. refers to the results of the
present model under perfect competition.^® Although the models are
° Following DRW, I assume that the benefit from unemployment (6) is from home production and not a
market good. Hence, the observed consumption level is = C - (1 - «)6. By the same rationale, since the
observed output level (y'") is a final good, I deduct the cost of creating the vacancy (cv) from the total
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Table 2 A comparison of the second moment distributions
RC.
Q
II
o>
o = 5.1
Oy 1.35 1.35 1.44
OnlOy 0.59 0.59 0.67
OdOy 0.52 0.53 0.52
GilOy 2.97 3.14 3.25
Oy/nlOy 0.61 0.61 0.58
OcrelOn 7.06 7.04 5.10
Odes! On 121 7.24 6.42
Table 3 Cross correlations
cre(t+j) & n(t) des(t+j) & n(t) cre(t+j) & des(t)
-3 0.08 -0.43 -0.14
-2 0.00 -0.60 -0.13
-1 -0.13 -0.76 -0.15
0 -0.34 -0.80 -0,29
1 -0.81 -0.32 0.55
2 -0.77 -0.11 0.65
3 -0.60 0.01 0.56
Table 4 The steady state values of selected variables
a = 6 a =5.1
y 3.32 3.08
n 0.84 0.80
e 0.63 0.49
Pw 0.45 0.38
Pf 0.70 0.77
n -0.60 -0.55
ere 0.051 0.063
des 0.051 0.063
different, the moments of the present model are similar to the corre
sponding numbers of US data and their calibrated results (refer to
Table 3 in DRW). This similarity is true for the cross-correlations
production. The calibrated results are presented by using this observed output and consumption.
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among job destruction, creation, and employment presented in Table
3 (refer to Table 4 in DRW). As established by DRW, future Job
creation and past Job destruction are negatively correlated with
employment. It is noteworthy that the impulse response functions of
the technology shock follow the simulated results in DRW as well (the
figure is omitted). The negative impact on output is especially persis
tent.
The modification of DRW's model is limited due to the tractability
of the model and calibration. However, I can extend the model by
relaxing the assumptions of perfect competition. I use a = 6 as the
base case, following Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Yun (1996),
and Ireland (2001). The corresponding markup rate is 1.2 in the
simple monopoly model. As shown in Table 1, I modify the technology
parameter (ao) to make it consistent with the other parameter
choices.
Regardless of this modification, the second column in Table 2
reveals that most of the second moments are identical for both cases
of perfect competition and monopolistic competition - denoted as P. C.
and CT = 6, respectively. The impulse response of employment is
slightly persistent in the case of monopolistic competition (Figure 1).
In this sense, the introduction of monopolistic competition does not
alter the quantitative result of the calibration. In summary, our results
are in line with the independent study of Krause and Lubik (2007a),
although the Job destruction rates are exogenous in their model.
A change in the markup rate provides another implication. In order
to investigate the effects of different markup rates, I change the value
of o to 5.7, without changing the other parameters. This change corre
sponds to a one percent change in the markup rate in the simple
monopoly model (i.e., the rate goes up to 1.212). The calibrated
values at the steady state are shown in Table 4. Due to increased
monopolistic power, the steady state output is reduced. In response
to this reduction of output, labor demand decreases and the labor
market becomes less tight (0). As a result, the probability of finding
Jobs (/>„) also decreases. This implies that the adjustment process for
unemployed workers takes longer under larger markup rates. On the
other hand, the levels of Job destruction rates are higher with higher
markup rates, and Job destruction is more sensitive to technology
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Figure 1 Impulse response of employment
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Figure 2 Impulse response of job creation rate
shocks (Table 4 and Figure 3).^^ Intuitively, under weak labor demand,
it is less costly for firms to adjust employment, because it is easier to
locate new workers when needed. Thus, the employment strategy of
It Is true that the impulse response functions of the job destruction rates appear quantitatively unchanged
in the figure. However, the impulse response functions are the percentage deviations from the steady state.
Since the steady state levels of job destruction rates are higher with higher markup rates, the effects on the
levels of job destruction rates and unemployment rates are greater.
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Figure 3 Impulse response of job destruction rate
firms is more flexible under higher markup rates.
With higher markup rates, the impulse response of employment is
amplified (Figure 1). The high response of firms' job destruction deci
sions causes an immediate change in employment in response to the
negative technology shock. In addition, the weak labor demand
reduces the market tightness, which increases the duration of unem
ployment and lengthens the adjustment process. Higher job destruc
tion and more persistent unemployment generates volatile movements
in employment rates, as shown in Table 2.^^ These results differ from
the predictions of Hornstein (1993) without search frictions in the
labor market, in which greater markup rates reduce the employment
fluctuation to output fluctuation in response to the technology shock.
It is noteworthy that these characteristics are clearly shared in other
models that include labor market search frictions and monopolistic
competition, such as those by Trigari (2004), Rotemberg (2006), and
Andres et al. (2006). In particular, Rotemberg (2006) reveals the
effect of variations in market power in the job search model, and,
therefore, the result of the current study is closely related to them.
2 Note that the standard error of employment is divided by the standard error of output, which is greater for
higher markup rates. As a result, the level of volatility of n is much higher than it appears in the table.
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4 Conclusion
I calibrate the model with the bargaining solution of large firms in
which workers are heterogenous within a firm. The calibrated results
show that this model replicates DRW's standard job search model
under perfect competition. By extending the basic model to the case
of monopolistic competition, I find that an increase in markup rates
raises the persistence and impact of the technology shock on employ
ment through labor market friction. The present paper provides an
example to analyze the business cycle implications of search friction
in the labor market when Job destruction is critical and the firm size
matters.
Appendix
Derivation of (13). First, in the Bellman's equation of (7), the optimal
condition for capital k' is, 0 = -1 + Ea'\a Jki.n'j, k'j, a') x', where is
the partial derivative of J with respect to k'j . Second, the envelope
theorem with respect to k, yields the following:
Jk{nj,kj,a) = - w{nj,kj,a,ri.)) +1 - 5 = ^
(1 - (^)Qifc PjVj
kj
where I employ the formula of bargained wage of w. The simple
substitution delivers the result under the symmetric assumption.
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